This paper analyzes how trade agreements that modify the market opportunity for firms may affect the transition to early retirement among old employees in Switzerland. We argue that early retirement may not be a worker's decision, but may be induced (or even forced) by firms' behavior. To explore this avenue, we exploit the negotiation, announcement and implementation in the 1999-2002 period of the Bilateral Agreements I, a package of treaties liberalizing trade between the EU and Switzerland for some specific manufacturing industries, as a source of exogenous variation. In particular, we identify three groups of industries: a treatment group constituted of manufacturing industries affected by the trade policy reform, a control group of unaffected manufacturing industries and a control group of unaffected service industries. Using Swiss Labor Force Survey data, we implement a Difference in differences estimator, in which we compare early retirement behavior and wages among groups in a pre-treatment (1992-1998) period, in an announcement period (1999)(2000)(2001) and in an after-treatment or implementation (2002)(2003)(2004)(2005) period. Our empirical results show that the probability of early labor market exit of older workers increases in the affected manufacturing industries during the announcement period, but has no effect in the after-treatment period. On the contrary, wages increase in the affected manufacturing industries in the after-treatment period. This evidence is consistent with an early restructuring effort by firms operating in industries affected by Bilateral Agreement, in order to increase their degree of competitiveness.
Introduction
After WWII, for several decades, labor market participation of elderly workers, particularly male workers, has drammatically dropped, just while longevity was experiencing a spectacular increase. In the last decade, however, this long run trend has been reverted, and retirement age has indeed started to increase in many developed countries. While this new retirement behavior had long been advocated by experts and policy-makers as a key factor in restoring the financial sustainability of unfunded pension systems, several open questions remain. Which factors contributed to the initial drop in retirement age and to the more recent change in the retirement behavior? Have these individuals' retirement decisions exclusively been induced by financial incentives? But even more fundamentally, can we actually fully attribute these decisions to the workers? Which role do the employees play in inducing their workers to exit the labor market?
In fact, most of the economic literature on early retirement has attributed this decision directly to the workers, and has emphasized the crucial role of financial incentives (see Gruber and Wise, 1999) built in the unfunded pension schemes. A political economy literature has analyzed the motivations behind the introduction of these incentives, as well as of other features of the system which facilitate early retirement (see CondeRuiz and Galasso, 2004) . Other contributions have examined the role played by other individual characteristics, such as health status, family links -namely, joint retirement or the existence of dependent elderly in the household (see De Micco, 2014) .
Much less attention has instead been devoted to the role directly played by the employees in inducing -or even forcing -individuals into retiring. The seminal paper by Lazear (1979) provides the theoretical background for understanding the incentives that firms may have to terminate the job match with their elderly workers in normal times. With firms facing a reduction in the demand of their products or having to restructure, additional incentives to accomodate their elderly workers out of the labor marker may arise, even more so in countries featuring strict employment protection legislations and high firing costs. Yet, the empirical evidence of this labor demand effect on early retirement are scant. (see Hakola and Uusitalo (2005) , , Dorn and Sousa-Poza (2007) )
In this paper, we exploit a shock to the manufacturing sector in Switzerland, consisting of the introduction of a bilateral trade agreement with the EU in 2002, to evaluate the effect of an exogenous change in dimension of the Swiss firms' potential market for final goods on their workers' retirement behavior. Our identification strategy relies on the sectoral variation embedded in this EU-Switzerland Bilateral Agreements I. In particular, we focus on one element of this Bilateral Agreement, known as the Mutual Recognition Agreement, which reduced trade barriers between Switzerland and the EU in some (but not all) industries in the manufacturing sector, by providing mutual recog-nition of conformity test, and for instance homogenizing packing and licesing. Swiss industrial products could reach the EU market quicker because they now only had to be tested once, while before two tests were necessary: one in Switzerland and one in the EU. The agreement eliminated considerable costs for Swiss export-oriented firms. A list of sectors for which the MRA between the EU and Switzerland was operational is presented in Table 10 . This Mutual Recognition Agreement did not affect other industries in the manufacturing sector, and the service sector.
Being surrounded by EU member countries, Switzerland has naturally had in the EU its main commercial partner. Nevertheless, the trade relations between the EU and Switzerland have had undergone different phases. In 1972, a Free Trade Agreement was signed. Later on, however, in a famous 1992 referendum, the Swiss citizens voted against entering the EU. This popular decision led to a different approach in the EUSwiss relations, based on bilateral agreement. The Bilateral Agreements I was thus negotiated, and the final agreement was signed 1999. This agreement was appoved by the Swiss citizens in 2000 through a referendum and was eventually implemented in June 2002. Within the Bilateral Agreements I, the Mutual Recognition Agreement reduced trading barriers in twenty manufacturing sectors (see the appendix), but had no impact on the other manufacturing sectors or on services.
The timing of the agreement and its sectoral variation allows us to identify a group of industries in the manufacturing sector that was affected, i.e., treated, and two groups that were instead not treated, i.e., the unaffected industries in the manufacturing sector, and the service sector. We also distinguish between two treatments. An announcement effect may have occurred between the final agreement in 1999 and its implementation in 2002; whereas the usual treatment occurs with the implementation in 2001. Hence, we will provide a diff-in-diff that exploits two thresholds in 1999 and in 2002.
We posit that firms in the sectors affected by the MRA 1 have the potential of facing a larger (EU) market, than the two other control groups. During the announcement period, firms in the affected manufacturing industries may choose to undergone a restructuring of their labor force to increase their degree of competitiveness on the EU market. Once the opening has taken place, they should be able to exploit this enlargement opportunity. To test these hypothesis, we consider the retirement behavior of male individuals aged between 58 and 64 years, who can hence retire early (on second pillar pensions) although they may not be able to draw benefits from the public unfunded first pillar scheme. We also analyze the employment and wage dynamics in these different industries over the three time periods.
We use data from the Swiss Labor Force Survey -a rotating panel with up to five interviews per person, which covers a representative sample of the Swiss population. Our sample consists of 2359 male individuals between the age 58 and 64 in the years 1992-2005. The Swiss Labor Force Survey provides information on sex, age, education level, and current wage, as well as detailed information on industry, location and size of the firm in which the individual is/was employed.
Our empirical results suggest that early retirement increases in the firms of the industries affected by the MRA during the announcement period, with respect to the firms in the other two control groups. Instead, no difference in early retirement emerges after the implementation of the agreement. When we consider the wage dynamics for the firms in the different groups, we find a large increase in the wages in the affected firms after the implementation of the MRA, but no major variation during the announcing period. These evidence are consistent with firms in the affected sector undergoing a restructuring process of their labor force through early retirement in the period between the signing of the agreement and its actual implementation. After the implementation, and the opening of the markets, wages increase in the industries affected by the MRA. These results are in line with Helm (2013) , who uses the same strategy based on the MRA announcement and implementation to show that firm exit rates drop in the affected industries also before the actual implementation of the agreement.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature. Section 3 describes the data and the Swiss institutional framework. Sections 4 and 5 present the methodology used and the results of our empirical analysis, respectively. Section ?? performs a heterogeneity analysis and Section 7 finally concludes.
Related literature
A large literature on early retirement decisions exists. Most theoretical and empirical contributions examine the retirement behavior as the outcome of an individual optimal decision problem. Many explanatory variables influencing the transition into retirement have been identified, starting with financial factors. There is in fact large evidence that early retirement is more prevalent in countries with more generous early retirement regulations, and that high replacement ratios and high implicit tax on continuing to work make early retirement more attractive (Gruber and Wise, 1999, Blondal and Scarpetta, 1998, Costa, 1998) .
Studies analyzing the labor demand factor in early retirement decisions are still very few. A theoretical model has been provided by Hutchens (1999) , who shows how early retirement may arises from firm's profit-maximizing behavior. The author suggests that in response to demand or technological shocks, employers offer to employees generous early retirement provisions to induce them to leave their job. The pension system is, hence, used as a kind of unemployment insurance which reduces dismissal cost for the firms. According to this model, Hakola and Uusitalo (2005) show that in Finland the unemployment risk of the older workers decreased after having imposed a partial experience rating on large employers. They argue that while the employee decisions are influenced by the level and the availability of the benefits, the employer decisions are also influenced by the share of the benefits that is charged to the firm, therefore by the degree of experience rating of these benefits. Bellmann and Janik (2010) provide general support for Hutchens' (1999) theoretical framework, by analyzing the relationship between the indicators of demand and technological shocks and the share of early retirement. Dorn and Sousa-Poza (2010) use ISSP data to show that countries facing recession and having a strict employment protection legislation have a higher share of involuntary retirement. The correlation between sectoral employment and early retirement is also analyzed by . He shows that downturns (upturns) in aggregate industry employment are associated with a higher (lower) probability of early retirement. Finally, Hallberg (2011) and Frimmel et al.(2014) show, respectively, that an increase in non-wage cost increases the retirement rate and firms with higher labor costs are associated with lower retiremet age. The variation in costs across companies is used to identify employer incentives to encourage early retirement.
Our paper relates also to a recent literature, which has used the approval and im- 3 The institutional framework and the data
The Social Security System
Switzerland's pension scheme is based mainly on two pillars. The first pillar consists of the state-run basic PAYG old age system. This scheme is mandatory for all employees, self-employed, and unemployed individuals over the age of 20. This unfunded system is financed by payroll taxes, which amount to 9.8% of the individual's labor market income. The general retirement age is currently 65 for men and 64 for women. The normal retirement age for women was ratcheted up in two steps from 62 to 63 years in 2001, and to 64 years in 2005. The option of drawing an early retirement pension was introduced in the system in 1997, with the 10th AHV revision. After this reform, individuals are allowed to claim benefits up to one year (and after 2001 to two years) prior to the general retirement age. The benefits are actuarially adjusted in case of early retirement. Pension benefits are reduced by an amount between 3.4% and 6.8% for each year of early withdrawal. On the other hand, pension benefits increase by over 5.2%
per year if a pension is drawn after the normal retirement age (but within a five year period).
The second pillar consists of fully-funded company pension plans. They are compulsory for employees, whose income exceeds a minimum threshold established each year. Employees whose income is below the threshold and self-employed persons can, however, also opt to self-insure. The total contribution to be share between employers and employees amounts on average to 17% of the individual wage. The minimum age of entitlement varies across pension plans. However, many plans allow early retirement, by offering an option for early withdrawal from employment at actuarially fair reductions. Other private plans may even provide supplementary pensions to bridge the gap until the individual is eligible to receive her public first pillar pension. On average, the observed retirement in occupational plans is substantially below the statutory age even in funds that do not explicitly subsidize early retirement. (Butler, 2004 ).
Switzerland's policy on European Union
Switzerland is one of the four most important trading partner for the EU, while the EU is by far the most important trading partner for Switzerland. The initial basis of economic relationship between Switzerland and the European Union was placed in 1972 with the approval of the Free Trade Agreement, which eliminated quotas and customs duties on industrial goods. Twenty years later, in 1992, the Swiss electorate in a referendum rejected to join the European Union. After the rejection of this EEA Agreement, the Federal Council decided to pursue its economic relations with the EU on a bilateral basis. Two packages of bilateral agreements were negotiated and signed respectively in 1999 and in 2004.
The Bilateral Agreements I signed by the EU and Switzerland in 1999 includes seven treaties. These Agreements were approved by the Swiss electorate in 2000 and was then enacted in 2002. The seven agreements pertains the free movement of persons, mutual recognition agreement (MRA), public procurement markets, agriculture, overland transport, civil aviation and research. These agreements, together with the initial Free Trade Agreement, ensured easier access to the European Market for Swiss companies, and viceversa.
In this paper, we exploit the variation in the trade opportunities induced by the MRA. The MRA simplifies the admission of products in Switzerland and in the European Union by providing for the mutual recognition of conformity assessment issued by recognized EU and Swiss authorities. The second group of agreements, the Bilateral agreements II, were signed in 2004 but the time of implementation differs across single agreements. These treaties extend political cooperation to other areas like culture, pension and environment.
The data and descriptive analysis
In our analysis, we use data from the Swiss Labor Force Survey. Since 1991, the Federal Statistical Office has conducted the SLFS on an annual basis. It is a rotating panel with up to five interviews per person and covers a representative sample of the Swiss population. We use a sample of about 2359 male individuals between the age 58 and the normal retirement age in the years 1992-2005. We follow the relevant literature and consider the retirement an absorbing state, thus we censor observations after retirement. An important attribute of the SLFS is that it obtains information on the actual labor market activity of respondents if they are working at the time of the survey and on their preceding job if they are out of the labor force. Using this information, we define retirement to occur when an individual aged from 58 to 63 (or in general aged two years less than the normal retirement age) is currently working, but to be out of the labor force in the following year.
The data provide information on sex, age, education level 2 , and current wage, as well as detailed information on industry, location and size of the firm 3 in which the individual is/was employed. The affiliation to the labor market industry is a crucial aspect of our analysis. The NOGA 2002 classification is used in our data to identify the industry. We use the Directive 98/37/EC, as provided in EC (2002) Table 3 summarizes levels and changes in the average early retirement rate across the three groups of industries in the pre-treatment, announcement and implementation period. The averages are calculated using data in the years before the Bilateral Agreements were signed (years 1992-1998, Before), in the years between the signature and the implementation (1999-2001, Announcement), and in the years after the implementation (2002-2005, After ).
[Table3 here]
The statistics in Panel 1 show that in the Before period the probability of opting for early retirement is on average the same in the treatment and in the control group. In the Announcement period, a significant difference emerges across groups, due to a large increase in early retirement in the treatment group. After 2002, in the implementation period, the difference disappears as early retirement in the treatment group decreases. In Panel 2 we look at the second control group: services. In this case, there is some evidence of more early retirement in the control group in the Before period. This difference is completed reverted during the Announcement period, because of the large increase in early retirement in the treatment group. And it goes back to the initial situation after 2002, in the implementation period.
Empirical Strategy
We analyze the impact of the change in trade policy originated by the Bilateral Agreements on the probability of early retirement. Early retiree is defined as a male individual aged 59 and older who is neither an active employee nor eligible for full pension, but was working in the previous period. We identify male individuals employed in industries which were subject to the Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) as the treatment group and we employ two different control groups either with individuals employed in manufacturing industries which were not covered by the MRA, or with individuals employed in the service sector (and thus again non affected by the MRA). We use a Difference in differences estimation approach to compare the pre-treatment period (1992-1998) to the announcement period (1999) (2000) (2001) and to the after treatment (i.e., after implementation) period (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) . We run a number of individual-level regressions and compare the changes in the probability of opting for early retirement across the two groups of individuals for these three periods. We use a Linear Probability Model. Clearly, in order to estimate the causal effect of the Bilateral Agreements on early retirement transition via the Difference-in-differences approach, we assume a common trend assumption. That is, we assume that, in the absence of the trade agreements, the difference in the outcome between the treatment group and the two control groups would have remained the same.
The baseline Difference in differences estimator is of the form:
where Y is the outcome of interest and indicates whether the individual is early retired. The variable T reatment accounts for average permanent differences between treatment and control group, whereas Announcement and Af ter captures the temporal trends common to both groups during the announcement and the implementation period. T reatment * Announcement and T reatment * Af ter are the interaction terms between the two respective dummies and measure the true effect of the respective treatments: announcement and implementation. X is a vector of covariates controlling for firms' and individuals' characteristics. In particular we include dummies for size of firm in which the individual is/was employed, age, gender, education level and marital status.
Finally, ε is an error term. In a further specification we add dummies for each industry, year and region.
To explore further the effects of the trade agreements on the labor market dynamics, we use as outcome of interest also the logarithm of the individual wages for all male workers, and for male workers aged 41 to 50. Table 4 and Table 5 present our estimation results. In Table 4 we look at the announcement and implementation effect of the Bilateral Agreement by comparing the early retirement behavior in the treatment group (MRA manufacturing industries) with the first control group (non-MRA manufacturing industries), while in Table 5 the control group is based on male individuals working in the service sector. In both tables, column 1 reports the estimates of the equation 1 with no control variables and only age fixed effects; in column 2, control variables and year fixed effects are included, and in column 3 the results of the specification including firm size, industry, region and year dummies are included. Standard errors are clustered at the industry-year level.
Results
[ Table 4 here]
In Table 4 , the coefficients on the T reatment variable are not statistically significant to indicate that there are no differences in the probability of taking early retirement across the two groups of individuals. Analogously, the coefficients on the announcement and treatment periods are not significant to suggest that no temporal trends common to both groups emerge. The comparison on retirement behavior in firms belonging to MRA versus non-MRA manufacturing industries shows however that more early retirement takes place in the affected sectors during the announcement period. In fact, the coefficient on the interaction term Announcement*After is statistically significant and positive in all columns. The signature of the agreement is indeed associated with an increase of approximately 0.085 in the probability of early labor force withdrawal. Instead, the coefficient on the interaction term Treatment*After is never statistically significant: the actual implementation of the MRA does not seem to affect the probability of early labor force withdrawal.
The same results emerge from looking at the difference between the treatment group and the second control group, as shown at Table 5 . In fact, the coefficient on the interaction term Announcement*After is always statistically significant and positive in all columns; whereas the coefficient on the interaction term Treatment*After is never statistically different from zero.
[ Table 5 here] Tables 6 to 9 show the results of the effects of the trade agreement on the wage dynamics. At table 6, we consider the wages for all male workers, and compare MRA and non-MRA sectors. The coefficient of the interaction term Treatment*After is positive and significant, thus suggesting that wages increase in the MRA sectors after the implementation of the agreement. When we turn to comparing firms in the MRA manufacturing sectors with firms in the service sector (our second control group), however, as shown at table 7 , the trade agreements seem to have no impact on wages. The results may however be biased by a composition effect, since the average wage in each sector is affected by the age composition of the work force, as driven for instance by the retirement behavior described in the previous analysis. At tables 8 and 9 , we thus consider the wages of male workers in their prime age only, i.e., from 41 to 50 years. The empirical evidence suggests that the implementation of the agreement is associated with an increase of at least 4% in the wages of these workers in the MRA manufacturing sectors, as opposed to the non-MRA manufacturing sectors. Importantly, no average differences in wages emerge across these two groups of individuals (see Treatment), and no temporal trends common to both groups emerge. The evidence is confermed at Table  9 , which reports the results of the comparision between the wages of the male workers aged 41-50 in the MRA manufacturing industries and in the service sector.
[ Table 6 here] [ Table 7 here]
[ Table 8 here] [ Table 9 here] 6 Heterogeneity analysis: TBA
Concluding remarks
The retirement is a crucial aspect of all pension policies and its determinants have long been analyzed. Most of the existing literature focus on the labor supply decisions by the workers and see retirement as a pure labor supply phenomenon. The aim of this paper is to show that retirement choices are complex decisions that involve several actors besides the elderly workers. Decisions by the employers of retaining the aging employees or rather push them into retirement play a crucial role. This is an aspect to take into account when policies aimed at increasing the individual's incentive to postpone retirement are designed. However, the role of the firms in early retirement decisions is difficult to identify empirically. This paper exploits the negotiation and implementation of the Bilateral Agreements I between 1998 and 2002 between the EU and Switzerland, as a source of exogenous variation affecting the labor demand of Swiss firms. Using a Differences in differences approach, we show that firms affected by this MRA increase their use of early retirement provisions (with respect to the control groups) already already in 1999, i.e., when the agreement was initially signed. However, this retirement behavior does not continue after 2002, i.e., when the Bilateral Agreements I was actually implemented. After 2002, however, firms in the manufacturing industries affected by the MRA display an increase in wages. These evidence is consistent with a restructuring process taking place at the announcement of the Agreement, during which firms in MRA industries induced their male elderly workers to retire. This behavior may be consistent with an increase in competitiveness, as the average wage paid to prime age workers increased in these sectors after the implementation -but not the announcement -of the Mutual Recognition Agreement. Note. Pre-treatment baseline covariates in treatment and control groups and their difference. Sample of years 1992-1998. Standard errors in parenthesis. The following symbols indicate different significance levels: *** -significant at 1 percent, ** -significant at 5 percent, * -significant at 10 percent. 
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